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Bombs, Bodies, Acts
The Banalization of Suicide
enGIn F. ISIn AnD melISSA l. FInn
We	try	retrospectively	to	 impose	some	kind	of	meaning	on	it,	 to	find	
some	kind	of	interpretation.	but	there	is	none.	And	it	is	the	radicality	of	
the	spectacle,	which	alone	is	original	and	irreducible.
Jean Baudrillard1
Two	and	a	half	decades	ago,	it	would	have	been	fanciful	to	imagine;	men	and	
women	 ramming	 into	 targets	 and	 blowing	 themselves	 and	 all	 else	 around	
them	into	bits	with	bombs	strapped	to	their	bodies	or	vehicles.	it	would	have	
been	even	more	difficult	 to	 imagine	 that	 such	acts	would	become	everyday	
occurrences	 in	 places	 as	 geographically	 separated	 and	 culturally	 diverse	 as	
Algiers,	baghdad,	beirut,	buenos	Aires,	Cairo,	Colombo,	Grozny,	islamabad,	
istanbul,	 Jerusalem,	 kabul,	 karachi,	 london,	 madrid,	 moscow,	 new	 york,	
and	St.	Petersburg.	Then,	the	radicality	of	these	acts	of	suicide	violence	was	
their	original	 and	 irreducible	 character,	 as	baudrillard	 saw,	 which	gave	 life	
and	death	new	meanings.2	now,	 the	acts	 are	no	 longer	unexpected,	unpre-
dictable,	or	original,	but	rather	routinized,	ritualized,	and	mimetic	practices.	
if	Albert	Camus	thought	suicide	was	the	only	serious	philosophical	problem,	
what	would	he	have	thought	of	banalized	suicide	violence?3
The	literature	on	suicide	violence	appears	clustered	around	two	diametri-
cally	opposed	positions.	on	the	one	hand	suicide	violence	appears	as	an	abso-
lute	evil,	and	on	the	other	as	an	absolute	good.	What	theoretical	resources	are	
available	to	us	to	interpret	suicide	violence	as	acts	without	condemning	them	
as	absolute	evil	(thus	refusing	to	recognize	the	grounds	on	which	suicide	vio-
lence	became	possible,	even	justifiable)	or	as	absolute	good	(thus	participat-
ing	in	their	senselessness)?	it	is	obvious	to	us	that	it	is	irresponsible	to	refuse	
to	 see	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 suicide	 bombings	 are	 justified	 and	 then	
condemn	them	as	evil	acts.	yet,	it	becomes	complicity	to	recognize	the	con-
ditions	and	say	the	acts,	in	their	succession,	are	justifiable	self-defense	when	
the	self-defense	itself	enacts	the	very	oppression	it	laments.	While	remaining	
sensitively	aware	of	the	grounds	that	make	acts	of	suicide	violence	possible,	
we	wish	 to	explore	how	 the	once	 radical	 act	of	authenticity	and	originality	
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has	 been	 reduced	 to	 an	 act	 of	 imitation,	 and	 how	 it	 has	 been	 transformed	
into	 a	 routinized,	 ritualized,	 and	 mimetic	 practice.	 it	 is	 troubling	 that	 sui-
cide	 bombings	 have	 become	 habitus	 (as	 bourdieu	 understood	 that	 concept	
as	a	relatively	enduring	and	socially	produced	disposition	through	instituted	
and	repetitive	practices	in	specific	fields	such	as	war,	media,	politics,	and	art).4	
That	suicide	violence	has	become	habitus	increasingly	renders	it	both	unques-
tioned	and	unquestionable	while	it	is	also	both	imagined	and	unimaginable.	
This	mimetic	logic	continually	produces	a	compulsion	for	repetition,	which,	
in	turn,	creates	a	neurosis	of	the	body	politic	and	of	the	citizen	through	which	
the	fear	of	repetition	creates	more	repetition.5	We	suggest	that	the	“War	on	
Terror”	and	suicide	violence	may	have	become	two	aspects	of	the	same	cycle	
of	repetition	that	produces	the	neurotic	citizen	and	suicide	violence	as	both	
its	cause	and	effect.
	To	an	 extent,	 things	were	 easier	 for	Camus	 than	 for	us:	he	 thought	 that	
suicide	was	a	confession	by	those	for	whom	life	either	was	too	much	or	was	
beyond	understanding.6	Camus	could	not	see	suicide	as	revolt.	For	Camus,	
living	was	revolt.	While	revolt	gives	life	its	value,	suicide	escapes	it.	Can	we	fol-
low	Camus	to	refuse	suicide	violence	as	revolt?	Things	were	indeed	much	eas-
ier	for	Camus.	From	Émile	Durkheim	to	Camus,	Western	thought	has	always	
individualized	suicide,	seeing	it	as	the	act	of	a	singular	individual.7	in	fact,	as	
Slavoj	Žižek	observed,	 for	both	Durkheim	and	Camus	“suicide	becomes	an	
existential act,	the	outcome	of	a	pure	decision,	irreducible	to	objective	suffer-
ing	or	psychic	pathology.”8	While	suicide	violence	always	involves	the	act	of	
an	individual,	it	is	much	more	complicated	by	the	fact	that	by	being	resolutely	
directed	toward	and	 involving	 the	other,	 it	produces	a	new	figure—the	sol-
dier-martyr—as	the	actor.	This	new	figure	is	simultaneously	a	warrior	against	
oppression,	injustice,	and	abjection	and a	weapon.
While	suicide	violence	has	been	justified	as	the	weapon	of	the	weak	and	the	
only	means	available	to	actors	who	lack	advanced	tactical	weaponry	to	resist	
domination,	oppression,	injustice,	and	abjection,	the	banalization	of	such	acts	
is	revealed	in	the	transformation	of	means	into	ends	and	in	the	transforma-
tion	from	the	act	 to	an	everyday	practice.	The	banal	effects	of	 this	violence	
can	 be	 seen	 not	 only	 in	 its	 systematization,	 routinization,	 rationalization,	
and	 ritualization	 among	 potential	 new	 actors,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 modern-day	
soldier-martyr	who	remains	(or	who	seems	to	remain)	calmly	detached	when	
carrying	out	these	acts—acts	that	seem	to	target	combatant	and	noncomba-
tant	populations	with	the	same	kind	of	virulence	and	indifference	and	in	fact	
erase	the	difference	between	the	two.	The	banalization	of	suicide	is	tied	to	the	
normalization	of	violence	and	the	senseless	destruction	of	life.	The	ultimate	
act	 of	 sacrifice	 is	 no	 longer	 only	 for	 the	 brave,	 but	 also	 for	 people	 who,	 by	
way	of	heedless	or	reactionary	or	disciplined	acts,	snuff	out	themselves	and	
others.
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We	use	the	term	“banalization”	here	as	an	adjective	to	describe	the	effects	
and	 affects	 of	 suicide	 violence;	 the	 terms	 “banalization”	 or	 “banality”	 are	
employed	not	to	trivialize	the	grounds	of	the	act,	the	suffering	of	those	who	
are	caught	in	the	act	(which	includes	both	victims	and	the	perpetrators),	or	
the	act	itself	(or,	worse,	to	reify	suicide	violence	along	orientalist	lines).	The	
social	and	political	conditions	that	produce	suicide	violence	are	real	to	those	
who	experience	its	effects	on	the	ground.	We	draw	our	inspiration	from	han-
nah	Arendt’s	brave	use	of	the	term.9	Arendt	treated	banality	as	the	complete	
lack	of	imagination	of	an	actor	who	followed	evil	orders.	The	actor	is	a	cog	in	
the	war	machine	built	by	the	nazis.	What	we	wish	to	discuss	in	this	chapter	
is	not	“banality	of	evil”	but	“banalization	of	acts.”	We	use	“banalization”	to	
refer	to	the	increasing	predictability,	cliché,	and	prosaicism	of	suicide	violence	
in	the	world.	While	we	wish	to	recognize	the	grounds	on	which	acts	of	suicide	
violence	against	 life	may	become	 justifiable	 (domination,	oppression,	 injus-
tice,	 and	 abjection),	 we	 also	 insist	 that	 their	 transformation	 from	 acts	 into	
ongoing	practices	that	produces	habitus	erodes	their	legitimacy.10
The	long-running	debate	over	violence	and	politics	in	social	and	political	
thought	 involved	 illustrious	 scholars.11	 Franz	 Fanon,	 Jean-Paul	 Sartre,	 Carl	
Schmitt,	Georges	Sorel,	and	max	Weber,	despite	their	differences,	tended	to	
recognize	 violence	 as	 both	 justifiable	 and	 legitimate	 foundation	 of	 a	 body	
politic.12	by	contrast,	hannah	Arendt,	Walter	benjamin,	and	Jacques	Derrida	
were	much	more	ambivalent	about	the	equivalence	between	justification	and	
legitimization	 of	 violence.13	 Arendt	 expressed	 this	 crucial	 distinction	 well.	
She	 insisted	 that	 while	 those	 who	 have	 been	 subjected	 to	 abject	 conditions	
and	injustice	may	well	be	justified	in	using	violence	against	their	oppressors,	
violence	itself	could	not	be	considered	a	legitimate	foundation	of	a	body	poli-
tic.	She	was	aware	that	“under	certain	circumstances	violence—acting	with-
out	argument	or	speech	and	without	counting	the	consequences—is	the	only	
way	to	set	the	scales	of	justice	right	again.”14	moreover,	while	Arendt	insisted	
on	seeing	violence	as	antipolitical	she	rejected	interpreting	acts	of	violence	as	
emotional	 or	 rational.15	 yet,	 for	 Arendt,	 violence	 against	 injustice,	 however	
justifiable,	when	it	is	rationalized	becomes	irrational.16	it	has	been	recognized	
that	much	of	modern-day	 suicide	violence	 is	not	generated	by	 irrational	or	
emotional	yearnings	that	are	intrinsic	to	the	cultures	or	religions	from	which	
they	spring.	but	that	does	not	mean	that	suicide	violence	is	inherently	ratio-
nal	either.	rather,	 suicide	violence	 that	becomes	 rationalized	and	banalized	
becomes	irrational.	The	banalization	of	suicide	is	the	repetition	that	reveals	
rationalizations,	especially	with	regard	to	noncombatant	life.	While	we	do	not	
aim	to	engage	with	this	 literature	on	violence,	we	draw	upon	it	to	conclude	
that	in	understanding	suicide	violence	as	political	acts,	there	must	be	a	neces-
sary	differentiation	between	justification	and	legitimacy.
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Understanding Acts of Suicide Violence
much	has	already	been	said	about	suicide	violence—we	feel	perhaps	too	much.	
nonetheless,	there	have	been	useful	(and	necessary)	classifications,	histories,	
documents,	 ethnographies,	 and	 accounts	 of	 both	 acts	 and	 actors.17	 but	 do	
we	understand	suicide	violence?	Arendt	makes	a	useful	distinction	between	
knowledge	and	understanding.	She	says	knowledge	makes	words	into	weap-
ons.	knowledge	becomes	less	interested	in	understanding	than	in	having	cor-
rect	information	and	classification.18	knowledge	aims	to	develop	unequivocal	
results,	 judges	 with	 certainty,	 and	 aims	 to	 intervene	 with	 effectiveness.	 by	
contrast,	understanding	“is	an	unending	activity	by	which,	in	constant	change	
and	variation,	we	come	to	terms	with	and	reconcile	ourselves	to	reality,	that	
is,	try	to	be	at	home	in	the	world.”19	We	aim	to	understand	suicide	violence	as	
acts	that	become	practices	and	then	habitus.20
We	appreciate	the	ambiguous,	open-ended,	and	nonessential	nature	of	act	
and	being	to	avoid	reproducing	dominant	representations	of	acts	of	suicide	
violence.21	The	fundamental	difficulty	about	discussing	suicide	violence	is	that	
we	are	attempting	to	make	sense	of	its	senselessness.	To	recognize	its	sense-
lessness	 is	 not	 to	 condemn	 the	 grounds	 (domination,	 oppression,	 injustice,	
and	abjection)	on	which	violent	acts	can	become	possible	and	justifiable.	Any	
interpretation	of	the	meaning	of	acts	of	suicide	violence	risks	closing	off	alter-
native	understandings	of	the	actor	and	the	act;	the	choice	of	silence	becomes	
implicated	in	problems	of	ethics,	fairness,	and	integrity.22	The	starting	point,	
then,	is	to	recognize,	as	esslin	eloquently	puts	it,	the	“illusoriness	and	absur-
dity	of	ready-made	solutions	and	prefabricated	meanings.”23
With	regard	to	the	aporia	of	understanding	phenomena	such	as	suicide	vio-
lence,	we	can	now	mention	several	caveats.	While	we	recognize	the	insightful	
and	ethical	approach	taken	by	mikhail	bakhtin	and	others	on	representation,	
we	also	recognize	that	even	the	subtitle	of	this	chapter,	“banalization	of	sui-
cide,”	 already	 begins	 to	 represent	 suicide	 violence	 as	 banalized,	 thus	 mov-
ing	us	away	from	the	pure	bakhtinian	ethics.	representation	is	unavoidable.	
bakhtin	 moreover	 argues	 that	 aestheticizing,	 historicizing,	 and	 abstracting	
acts	force	a	split	between	the	substance	of	the	act,	the	individual	experience	
of	 it,	 and	 the	 event	 as	 it	 unfolds.24	 in	 anticipation	 of	 concerns	 that	 may	 be	
raised	with	regard	to	historicizing,	abstracting,	and	ethics,	we	would	suggest	
the	following.
First,	 there	 is	an	important	difference	between	representing	an	act	as	an	
object	of	knowledge	and	understanding	it.	it	is	indeed	clear	that	suicide	vio-
lence	should	not	be	immediately	categorized,	reified,	and	represented	because	
in	doing	so	we	try	to	contain	it	and	seal	off	what	the	act	(and	the	actor)	can	
and	 cannot	 be	 (according	 to	 our	 own	 arbitrary	 specifications).	 The	 experi-
ence	of	those	who	are	caught	in	the	act	is	 incalculably	more	profound	than	
any	observer’s	understanding	or	witnessing	of	it.	Second,	in	order	to	under-
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stand	the	act	of	suicide	violence,	we	must	recognize	its	historical	and	political	
grounds.	Suicide	violence	must	be	contextualized	within	the	system	of	power	
relations	 and	 domination,	 oppression,	 injustice,	 and	 abjection	 that	 compel	
actors	to	enact	acts	of	death.	Third,	regarding	the	problem	of	abstraction,	while	
it	may	seem	that	we	abstract	suicide	violence	by	saying	that	it	is	banalized,	we	
are	not	referring	to	the	acts	of	suicide	violence,	but	rather	to	the	way	in	which	
the	succession	and	series	of	acts	are	transformed	into	everyday	practices.	It is 
the succession and repetition that banalize the act, thereby transforming it from 
an act into a practice, routine, and eventually habitus.	Fourth,	regarding	the	
problem	of	capturing	an	event	as	it	is	unfolding	and	possibly	diminishing	the	
interplay	 that	occurs	between	an	actor’s	processes	of	development	and	self-
understanding,	and	his	or	her	capacity	to	change,	we	would	say	that	bakhtin’s	
analysis	confronts	a	challenge	when	suicide	violence	 is	analyzed	because,	 if	
successful,	the	actor	actually	commits	to	death	and	dies.25	The	act	of	suicide	
violence	 is	 like	 no	 other	 act.	 it	 is	 not	 like	 the	 act	 of	 commanding	 because	
when	people	command,	they	are	still	alive	and	are	evolving	and	changing.26	
With	suicide	violence,	however,	there	is	the	problem	of	the	suicide	at	which	
point	the	actor	ceases	to	be,	ceases	to	be	in	flux,	and	ceases	to	exist	as	a	body.	
We	are	dealing	with	an	act	that	not	only	effaces	itself	but	also	is	aimed	at	the	
effacement	of	the	other.	Arendt	would	say	that	the	originality	of	acts	of	suicide	
violence	 is	horrible,	not	because	they	are	new	but	because	they	constitute	a	
rupture	with	our	understanding;	these	acts	explode	the	categories	of	political	
thought	and	standards	of	judgment.27
Freedom and Responsibility
We	shall	emphasize	the	three	elements	of	the	act:	actor,	freedom,	and	respon-
sibility.	Although	state	occupation	creates	the	conditions	for	suicide	violence	
(domination,	 oppression,	 injustice,	 and	 abjection),	 actors	 are	 still	 radically	
responsible	 for	 rendering	 acts	 of	 suicide	 violence.	 yet,	 there	 are	 problems	
related	to	the	contingencies	of	facticity	and	the	problem	of	the	alibi,	the	former	
referring	to	the	nature	of	the	constraints	on	the	actor	and	the	latter	referring	
to	the	kinds	of	excuses	used	by	actors	to	abdicate	responsibility.	So	the	ques-
tions	of	freedom	and	responsibility	of	actors	get	entangled	with	questions	of	
facticity	and	alibi.
The Question of Facticity
Jean-Paul	Sartre	argues	that	acts	shape	the	world,	which	suggests	an	orienta-
tion	of	means	and	ends,	and	a	fundamental	and	inextricable	 linkage	to	the	
other.	Sartre	always	insisted	that	no	contingency	or	fact	could	be	a	cause	over	
or	determine	action;	 the	being	orients	 itself	 freely	 from	a	 state	of	existence	
to	one	that	has	yet	to	unfold.	There	is	a	cause	for	all	acts,	and	yet,	the	act	is	
still	oriented	intentionally	toward	a	future	as-not-yet-realized.	The	nature	of	
the	act	is	not	already	determined	or	constituted,	but	is	rather	commanded	by	
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the	life	of	the	being	which	is	constantly	oriented	toward	its	potentiality.	The	
project	of	being-in-the-world	always	involves	choice.	The	being	is	constrained	
by	contingencies	that	develop	out	of	the	choices	it	has	made;	the	potentiality	
of	some	future	path	is	made	concrete	as	it	unfolds.	Since beings can refer to no 
one as having already constituted the future path, they are radically responsible 
for the act and that which springs from the act.	in	every	instance,	the	subject	
must	fashion	his	criterion	for	action	because,	according	to	Sartre,	there	is	no	
universal	code	for	action	or	categorical	imperative	that	can	render	such	acts	
justifiable.	To	say	that	a	categorical	imperative	exists	is	to	fall	back	on	a	false	
projection	(to	project	oneself	in	the	name	of	a	universal	law	of	conduct).28
The	implications	for	acts	of	suicide	violence	are	as	follows:	the	soldier-mar-
tyr	 is	 a	 free	actor,	 to	 the	extent	 that	he	or	 she	may	make	choices,	 and	may	
establish	a	particular	motive	and	an	end	goal	for	which	radically	responsibil-
ity	is	established.	The	soldier-martyr	makes	himself	and	is	constituted	within	
each	moment	of	enactment	(which	ultimately	ends	with	death).	The	moment	
the	soldier-martyr	enacts	himself,	 the	moment	 the	soldier-martyr	has	real-
ized	his	goal	of	self-annihilation	and	-immolation	as	responsive	action	and	
political	message,	he	 is	no	longer	able	to	stand	accountable	and	responsible	
for	his	acts.	This	invariably	creates	a	problem	for	the	being	who	is	responsible	
for	the	deaths	of	the	victims	but	who	can	no	longer	stand	to	be	judged	for	the	
act.	There	is,	moreover,	the	problem	of	how	each	enactment	of	suicide	violence	
increases	the	attractiveness	of	the	act	as	a	form	of	responsive	action	because	
of	the	impression	and	desire	it	leaves	in	the	mind	of	another	to	do	the	same.	
Thus,	as	emmanuel	lévinas	points	out,	 it	 is	of	 irreducible	significance	 that	
our	 responsibility	 for	 the	death	of	 the	other	 invariably	puts	 an	 ethic	upon	
us	 (and	we	are	equally	 responsible	 for	 the	host	of	other	actors	who	see	our	
original	acts	as	precedent	and	inspiration	to	act	similarly).29	in	other	words,	
soldier-martyrs,	 like	 all	 actors,	 are	 implicated	 in	 the	 consequences	 of	 their	
acts	and	the	way	those	consequences	affect	others.
now,	 it	 is	 “radical”	 rather	 than	 “absolute”	 responsibility	 that	 is	 enjoined	
upon	acting	beings.	The	actor’s	responsibility	is	not	absolute	because	all	beings	
are	constrained	by	various	forms	of	facticity	such	as	place,	past,	environment,	
relational Other,	 and	 death that	 cannot	 be	 changed	 by	 free	 will.	 According	
to	Sartre,	beings	insert	“action	into	the	network	of	determinism.”30	The	place	
consists	of	that	which	is	manifested	to	the	being	(the	location	of	birth,	the	place	
of	 relations);	 where	 someone	 is	 born	 constrains	 choice	 and	 opens	 up	 other	
opportunities.	 Thus,	 the	 soldier-martyr	 may	 face	 limited	 choices	 by	 being	
born	in	a	violent	society,	but	his	birthplace	does	not	cause	the	actor	to	decide	
to	self-annihilate.31	There	are	many	people	in	similar	conditions	who	do	not	
choose	 this	path	 in	 life.	The	past	of	 the	actor	 includes	any	previous	choices	
made	that	cannot	be	undone,	but	the	past	does	not	determine	the	future,	nor	
does	it	direct	the	actor	irrevocably	toward	a	future	decision	to	self-annihilate.	
As	for	the	environment,	the	field	of	action	is	always	conducted	through	a	con-
figuration	of	objects	(certain	immovable	or	movable	objects,	buildings,	sets	of	
infrastructure,	natural	settings,	etc.)	that	are	placed	and	unplaced	and	that	are	
wholly	indifferent	and	undecided	by	the	actor.	The	actor	is,	however,	free	and	
responsible	in	a	situation	despite	the	“unpredictability	and	the	adversity	of	the	
environment.”32	The	relational Other	is	a	contingent	fact	that	is	existent	and	
discovered	in	every	choice	in	life.	beings	are	free	(despite	the	givenness	of	the	
other	who	has	not	come	into	the	world	through	them)	to	apprehend	the	other	
as	subject	or	object,	as	real	or	abstracted.	While	the	actor	cannot	necessarily	
decide	what	the	other	will	do	or	do	to	him,	he	is	radically	responsible	for	his	
action	as	it	becomes	implicated	in	the	life	of	the	other.	The	last	kind	of	facticity	
described	by	Sartre	is	death.	The	being,	despite	the	inevitability	and	finitude	of	
death,	can	direct	his	project	toward	or	in	spite	of	death,	and	he	can	realize	and	
actualize	his	own	freedom-to-die;	the	being	enjoys	a	totality	of	“free	choice	of	
finitude.”33	but	death	does	not	necessarily	mean	finitude	to	the	soldier-martyr.	
The	soldier-martyr	acts	toward	death,	motivated	not	necessarily	by	its	finality,	
but	by	the	belief	that	such	acts	are	worthy	of	reward	in	an	afterlife.	it	is	possible	
therefore	that	the	soldier-martyr	may	actualize	his	own	“freedom-to-die”	as	
a	free	choice	while	denying	the	finality	of	death.	The	soldier-martyr	ruptures	
death	as	facticity	(as	a	constraint	to	his	realm	of	choices).
There	are	contradictions	of	banality	vis-à-vis	the	question	of	death	in	mod-
ern	 suicide	 violence.	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 soldier-martyr	 projects	 himself	
freely	 toward	 a	 “final	 possibility”	 in	 death	 and,	 in	 so	 doing,	 actualizes	 the	
authentic	existence,	one	that	is	pried	away	from	the	banalization	of	the	ordi-
nary	and	attains	“the	irreplaceable	uniqueness”	of	itself.34	on	the	other	hand,	
the	 increasingly	common	and	 increasingly	ordinary	character	of	 these	acts	
substantially	undermines	their	“irreplaceable	uniqueness,”	the	legitimacy	and	
honor	of	an	authentic	life	and	projected	death.	it	has	become	the	once	ulti-
mate	act	of	authenticity	degraded	down	to	repetition	and	mimesis.	it	is	an	act	
of	followers	and	no	longer	of	leaders.	The	lamb	is	not	unique,	and	its	slaughter	
is	like	a	thousand	others.	moreover,	the	choice	of	death	robs	the	life	and	situa-
tion	of	its	meaning	and	sacrality,	while	the	problems	that	the	act	was	meant	to	
address	remain	unresolved.	The	choice	to	escape	the	ineffable	of	one’s	facticity	
(the	presence	and	 imposition	of	place,	past,	 environment,	 relational	others,	
and	future	death)	through	death	is	weakness,	for	alternative	solutions	to	the	
life	were	not	acted	upon.	in	Sartre’s	words,
Suicide	 is	 an	 absurdity	 which	 causes	 my	 life	 to	 be	 submerged	 in	 the	
absurd.	.	.	.	Death	[nihilation]	is	not	only	the	project	which	destroys	all	
projects	and	which	destroys	itself.	.	.	.	it	is	also	the	triumph	of	the	point	
of	view	of	the	other	over	the	point	of	view	which	i	am	toward	myself.35
The	concept	of	radical	responsibility	 is	deflated	by	claims	that	actors	are	
limited	by	ignorance	and	error.	This	reminds	us	of	max	Weber	and	Talcott	
Parsons,	both	of	whom	emphasized	that	acts	are	rational	despite	the	ignorance	
AU: “ineffability”?
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figuration	of	objects	(certain	immovable	or	movable	objects,	buildings,	sets	of	
infrastructure,	natural	settings,	etc.)	that	are	placed	and	unplaced	and	that	are	
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action	as	it	becomes	implicated	in	the	life	of	the	other.	The	last	kind	of	facticity	
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ern	 suicide	 violence.	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 soldier-martyr	 projects	 himself	
freely	 toward	 a	 “final	 possibility”	 in	 death	 and,	 in	 so	 doing,	 actualizes	 the	
authentic	existence,	one	that	is	pried	away	from	the	banalization	of	the	ordi-
nary	and	attains	“the	irreplaceable	uniqueness”	of	itself.34	on	the	other	hand,	
the	 increasingly	common	and	 increasingly	ordinary	character	of	 these	acts	
substantially	undermines	their	“irreplaceable	uniqueness,”	the	legitimacy	and	
honor	of	an	authentic	life	and	projected	death.	it	has	become	the	once	ulti-
mate	act	of	authenticity	degraded	down	to	repetition	and	mimesis.	it	is	an	act	
of	followers	and	no	longer	of	leaders.	The	lamb	is	not	unique,	and	its	slaughter	
is	like	a	thousand	others.	moreover,	the	choice	of	death	robs	the	life	and	situa-
tion	of	its	meaning	and	sacrality,	while	the	problems	that	the	act	was	meant	to	
address	remain	unresolved.	The	choice	to	escape	the	ineffable	of	one’s	facticity	
(the	presence	and	 imposition	of	place,	past,	 environment,	 relational	others,	
and	future	death)	through	death	is	weakness,	for	alternative	solutions	to	the	
life	were	not	acted	upon.	in	Sartre’s	words,
Suicide	 is	 an	 absurdity	 which	 causes	 my	 life	 to	 be	 submerged	 in	 the	
absurd.	.	.	.	Death	[nihilation]	is	not	only	the	project	which	destroys	all	
projects	and	which	destroys	itself.	.	.	.	it	is	also	the	triumph	of	the	point	
of	view	of	the	other	over	the	point	of	view	which	i	am	toward	myself.35
The	concept	of	radical	responsibility	 is	deflated	by	claims	that	actors	are	
limited	by	ignorance	and	error.	This	reminds	us	of	max	Weber	and	Talcott	
Parsons,	both	of	whom	emphasized	that	acts	are	rational	despite	the	ignorance	
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and	error	of	the	actors	that	arise	from	their	inadequate	or	incorrect	knowledge	
of	the	conditions	or	situations	of	their	acts.36	moreover,	they	argue,	so	long	as	
acts	are	rational,	they	involve	responsibility.	Such	thinking	tends	to	deflate	the	
freedom	 and	 responsibility	 enjoined	 upon	 acting	 beings,	 including	 soldier-
martyrs.	Action	can	be,	however,	motivated	by	a	real	or	perceived	 injustice	
that	renders	violence	by	annihilation	a	desirable	response.	Arendt	writes	that	
engagement	is	transformed	into	enragement	not	necessarily	because	of	injus-
tice,	 but	 rather	 hypocrisy.	 here	 the	 suicide	 violence	 is	 understandable:	 the	
soldier-martyr	desires
[t]o	tear	the	mask	of	hypocrisy	from	the	face	of	the	enemy,	to	unmask	
him	and	the	devious	machinations	and	manipulations	that	permit	him	
to	rule	.	.	.	to	provoke	action	even	at	the	risk	of	annihilation	so	that	the	
truth	may	come	out.37
it	is	for	this	reason	that	Arendt	thinks	violence	can	be	justified.38
With	 regard	 to	 freedom,	 and	 the	 relations	 of	 the	 actor	 with	 outside	 col-
lectivities,	this	much	is	possible:	it	is	possible	that	some	forms	of	indoctrina-
tion,	community	norms	and	expectations,	and	propaganda	wield	considerable	
power	and	influence	in	creating	conditions	that	foster	or	support	suicide	vio-
lence	as	a	response	(e.g.,	encouraging	the	soldier-martyr	to	act),	or,	on	the	flip	
side,	that	stymie	debate	or	suppress	legitimate	political	grievances.39	it	is	pos-
sible	that	an	individual,	group,	or	people,	when	faced	with	premeditated	mass	
murder,	terrorization,	or	torture	of	the	people	they	identify	with,	can	become	
temporarily	unreasonable	by	projecting	their	problems	on	substitute	others.	
on	the	other	hand,	again,	freedom	and	responsibility	are	undermined	when	
excuses	are	made	and	action	is	blamed	on	the	influence	of	collectivities;	despite	
the	facticity	of	the	relations	of	a	collectivity	to	an	actor,	the	soldier-martyr	still	
acts	freely	with	tenacity,	virulence,	and	indifference	toward	combatants	and	
noncombatants.	Violent	or	hostile	reactions	are	not,	moreover,	necessarily and 
simply	caused	by	oppression;	instead,	some	violence	is	fueled	by	the	ego,	delu-
sion,	and	a	“sense	of	impotence.”40	Acts	of	suicide	violence	against	human	life	
are	acts	that	attempt	to	overcome	an	enemy	or	an	object.	Writing	along	similar	
lines,	 bakhtin	 argued	 that	 “[a]n	 indifferent	 and	 hostile	 reaction	 is	 always	 a	
reaction	that	impoverishes	and	decomposes	its	object:	it	seeks	to	pass	over	the	
object	in	all	its	manifoldness,	to	ignore	it	or	to	overcome	it.”41
The Problem of the Alibi
An	act,	if	it	is	to	be	an	act,	must	rupture	facticity	as	a	limit	on	action;	an	act	
must	 rupture	 the	 need	 to	 present	 an	 alibi.	 if	 one	 understands	 an	 actor	 (or,	
equally	as	important,	if	the	actor	understands	himself)	as	operating	as	a	secret	
representative	for	some	cause,	for	religion,	or	for	God,	one	turns	the	actor	(or	
he	turns	himself)	into	an	imposter	or	pretender.	in	principle,	a	claim	to	alibi	
is	a	claim	to	avoid	responsibility,	a	claim	to	avoid	an	act	of	one’s	own	choosing.	
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What	we	are	enacting	here	is	a	refusal	to	think	of	the	being	as	severed	from	
his	ontological	 roots	 in	personal	participation	(the	ongoing	event	of	being)	
because	who	the	actor	is	is	inextricably	associated	with	the	kinds	of	acts	he	
enacts.	The	choice	of	the	solider-martyr	to	participate	in	and	carry	out	an	act	
of	suicide	violence	through	death	to	self	and	others	is	ontologically	grounded	
in	the	act,	its	consequences,	and	the	being	itself.
Actors	 often	 employ	 euphemisms	 regarding	 war	 and	 violence	 as	 alibis.	
euphemisms	give	the	impression	that	an	act	was	carried	out	under	the	aus-
pices	of	a	more	benign	or	legitimate	purpose	than	is	possible	given	the	nature	
of	 such	 attacks.	 euphemisms	 for	 war,	 violence,	 terrorism,	 extermination,	
liquidation,	and	killing	 such	as	 “evacuations,”	 “surgical	 strikes,”	 and	“mar-
tyrdom”	operations	are	important	 linguistic	choices,	 indications	perhaps	of	
either	an	evasion	of	responsibility	 through	the	 invocation	of	an	alibi,	or	an	
easing	of	the	conscience.42	The	use	of	“war”	as	an	excuse	(an	alibi	about	which)	
to	do	violence	against	innocent	people	not	only	is	inexcusable43	but	also	calls	
the	legitimacy	of	the	act	into	question.
in	 this	discussion	of	 facticity,	 freedom,	responsibility,	and	alibi,	what	we	
are	driving	toward	is	the	answerability	of	the	actor:	the	ability	of	the	actor	to	
answer	for	the	content	of	the	act	and	the	being	who	enacts	it	in	a	succession	of	
moments	in	the	being-as-event,	to	bring	the	act	and	the	being	into	commu-
nication.44	The	answerable act	is	the	act	that	does	not	claim	an	alibi	to	evade	
responsibility;45	 it	 is	 an	 act	 that	 is	 answerably	 aware	 of	 itself.46	 Actors	 who	
invoke	an	alibi	often	invoke	a	universal	ethic	(a	categorical	imperative);	they	
take	shelter,	so	to	speak,	under	a	universal	principle	that	is	said	to	justify	the	
act.	bakhtin	writes,	“The	principle	of	formal	[kantian]	ethics	moreover	is	not	
the	principle	of	an	actually	performed	act	at	all,	but	is	rather	the	principle	of	
the	possible	generalization	of	already	performed	acts	in	a	theoretical	transcrip-
tion	of	them.”47	Sartre	concurs	in	a	slightly	different	way	by	arguing	that	the	
kantian	ethical	system	substitutes	doing	(action)	for	being	(actor)	as	the	most	
important	aspect	of	the	act.48	Sartre	and	bakhtin	are	emphasizing	an	ethics	of	
being:	the	unfolding	event	of	being	and	act	cannot	be	predetermined,	assumed	
into	a	generality,	and	therefore	theorized	upon	from	this	perspective.
The	answerable	act	is	the	fulfillment	of	a	decision	to	act.	The	answerable	
act	is	accountable,	other	oriented,	and	answerably	aware	of	itself.	Thus	the	act	
of	suicide	violence,	in	its	annihilation	of	the	actor	and	its	claims	of	justifica-
tion	vis-à-vis	an	 ideology	or	movement,	 is	not	an	answerably	aware	act.	by	
its	 very	 nature,	 suicide	 violence	 annihilates	 the	 actor	 and	 its	 answerability.	
The	actor	cannot	stand	to	account	for	the	act,	and	the	act	ceases	to	be.	The	
act	 is	not	answerable	 if	 the	actor	obeys	orders	because	of	 indoctrination	or	
if	military	discipline	is	used	as	an	alibi.	The	actor—in	our	case,	the	soldier-
martyr—knows	what	he	is	doing;	he	is	responsible	for	the	act.	being	unable	
to	answer	for	it,	however,	in	the	bakhtinian	sense	(because	of	death)	does	not	
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mean	that	the	actor	is	released	from	the	act	and	therefore	need	not	account	
for	the	act.
The Prosaicism of Suicide
The	concept	of	the	act	involves	an	effort	to	change	some	aspect	of	the	world,	
a	 set	 of	 means	 orientated	 toward	 some	 kind	 of	 end,	 and	 an	 implicit	 serial	
connectedness	 of	 action	 such	 that	 changes	 effected	 by	 one	 act	 will	 affect	 a	
subsequent	act,	thereby	producing	a	desired	goal.49	Arendt	wrote	in	On Vio-
lence	 that	 violence	 is	 a	 form	 of	 instrumental	 means	 whose	 ends	 condition	
the	 thought	and	action	of	people	and	 therefore	 require	guidance	and	 justi-
fication.50	Acts	of	suicide	violence	aim	to	question	and	unsettle	domination,	
oppression,	 injustice,	and	abjection.	Violence	 is	predicated	on	a	mean-ends	
evaluation,	and	violent	actors	are	always	faced	with	the	possibility	that	their	
means	may	overwhelm	their	ends.51
When	means	are	evaluated	in	relation	to	ends	or	an	end	goal,	it	is	often	said	
that	the	end	justified	the	means.	in	talk	of	means	and	ends,	one	can	look	at	the	
ways,	in	current	times,	that	suicide	violence	has	been	rendered	fashionable.	it	
ensures	the	continued	glorification	of	the	actor	as	hero	and	the	act	as	a	statement	
of	authentic	bravery.	As	acts	of	violence,	suicide	violence	employs	volunteer-
ism,	self-annihilation	and	-immolation,	and	killing	as	means	to	achieve	an	end	
that	places	value	and	importance	on	the	desired	end	of	emancipation.	Taken	
from	this,	we	want	to	examine	the	ways	in	which	“war	theaters”	have	ushered	
in	a	new	kind	of	means-ends	dichotomy	that	has	transformed	the	means	into	
the	end	in	itself	and	thus	made	them	routinized	and	habitual	practices.
one	can	see	the	banalization	of	suicide	violence	unfolding	through	a	means-
turned-ends	shift:	the	killing,	the	carnage,	becomes	an	end	in	itself;	and	the	
method	of	delivering	a	violent	message	is	the	end	in	banalized	violence.	Acts	
of	suicide	violence	may	have	originated	on	justified	grounds	of	domination,	
oppression,	injustice,	and	abjection.	however,	when	the	act	of	suicide	violence	
became	an	everyday	enactment,	it	appeared	that	perspectives	changed	(or	per-
haps	many	lost	their	perspective),	that	it	was	no	longer	horrible	to	kill	human	
beings	indiscriminately,	and	in	fact	that	was	often	the	goal.	The	original	pur-
poses	of	the	goal,	a	struggle	for	emancipation	or	resistance,	somehow	get	lost	
or	clouded	by	a	succession	of	violent	acts	that	employ	bloodshed	as	a	tool	of	
negotiation.	We	are	reminded	here	of	Friedrich	nietzsche’s	caution	that	just	
because	a	thing	comes	into	being	for	a	purpose	does	not	means	that	it	always	
serves	that	purpose.52	When	the	means	become	ends	in	the	context	of	a	“war	
theater,”	that	“theater”	becomes	absurd,	robbed	of	its	purpose,	 its	originary	
goals,	and	its	political	roots;	it	becomes,	as	it	were,	a	symbol	of	senseless	life	
senselessly	taking	life.	it	is	an	irremediable	exile	from	being	human,	a	depra-
vation	of	one’s	relation	with	the	other.53
A	violent	act	has	the	capacity	to	make	us	aware	of	a	grievance,	but	there	is	
always	the	danger	that	violence	will	move	unconsciously	 in	ways	that	over-
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whelm	 the	 goals	 and	 in	 directions	 that	 reproduce	 and	 reinforce	 the	 condi-
tions	of	its	grievance.54	The	contemporary	crisis,	writes	bakhtin,	is	that	there	
is	 often	 an	 abyss	 between	 the	 actual	 motivation	 for	 an	 act	 and	 its	 end;	 the	
end	makes	indeterminate	(it	is	walled	off	from)	the	actual	motivation	for	the	
act.55	Thus,	the	means-turned-end	shift	signals	two	things:	first,	the	original	
motivations	of	emancipation	or	martyrdom	are	severed,	because	of	the	killing	
that	becomes	the	end,	from	any	form	of	liberation	that	inevitably	results.	This	
is	clearly	the	case	because	the	end	no	longer	exists	when	the	banalized	repeti-
tion	of	means	(the	act	of	killing	as	means)	appears	to	replace	the	end	as	the	
goal.	Second,	 the	original	motivations	of	emancipation	and	martyrdom	are	
lost	in	the	serially	recurrent	acts	of	bodies	and	bits	that	not	only	are	prosaic	
and	cliché-like,	but	also	have	been	robbed	of	their	uniqueness	and	their	honor.	
modern	soldier-martyrs	believe	 that	 they	carry	an	 impressive	or	 legitimate	
message,	but	such	fantasies	are	not	revealed	through	their	deaths.
in	addition	to	the	shift	toward	calculability,	the	banalization	of	suicide	is	
revealed	in	the	concurrent	streams	of	attacks	that	are	being	perpetrated	on	a	
daily	basis.	Suicide	violence	has	become	everyday.	Suicide	violence	acts	have	
become	practices.	Such	practices	are	unimaginative,	predictable,	and	inane,	
though	this	in	no	way	trivializes	their	effects	or	affects.	one	can	experience	
firsthand,	or	read	and	hear	about,	an	act	of	 suicide	violence	 in	which	 large	
numbers	of	civilians	are	maimed	or	killed.	Suicide	violence	is	so	routinized	
that	 bombers	 have	been	woven	 into	 the	 daily	 functioning	 of	 people	 in	 and	
outside	of	war	or	occupation;	it	is	part	of	a	global	experiential	montage.	on	
the	news,	suicide	violence	no	longer	shocks	the	sensibilities	of	people.	The	day	
of	suicide	attacks,	of	yesterday	or	today	or	tomorrow,	is	“heavy	and	danger-
ous,”	and	with	each	passing	milestone,	we,	as	a	global	collective,	are	weary	
because	 the	 “calamity	of	 yesterday”	has	 changed	who	we	are.56	And	yet,	 as	
esslin	argues,	“the	more	things	change,	the	more	they	are	the	same”;	the	tears	
of	the	world	are	its	terrible	stability.57	The	repetitive	sameness	of	moving	time	
is	what	violence	produces	in	its	banalized	succession.	The	banalization	of	sui-
cide	violence	is	also	evidenced	in	the	rising	rates	of	volunteerism	for	martyr-
dom	operations	or	missions.	more	and	more	people	are	not	only	becoming	
but	also	choosing	to	become	part	of	the	banalized	repetition	of	day	in	and	day	
out	annihilating	bodies.	This	certainly	raises	serious	questions	about	the	glo-
riousness	of	a	mission	when	it	is	like	a	thousand	others.	There	is,	moreover,	a	
degree	of	banality,	cliché,	and	superficiality	in	the	soldier-martyr’s	formulaic	
approach	to	entering	heaven.58
it	is	the	everydayness	of	mimetic	murders,	wanton	vigilantism,	and	ven-
geance	 that	 is	 banalizing	 the	 acts	 of	 suicide	 violence	 and	 their	 effects.	 Jus-
tice	is	lost	when	a	single	human	being,	a	single	soldier-martyr,	can	arbitrarily	
render	his	verdict	on	the	guilty-as-imagined	as	judge,	jury,	and	executioner.	
The	everydayness	of	suicide	violence	and	their	effects	are	robbing	people	of	
a	sacred	appreciation	of	the	soul	and	twisting	the	divine	purpose	of	martyr-
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dom,	which	has	always	been	to	defend	family	and	home,	not	strike	a	people	
because	they	attend	a	different	religious	center.
Actor and the Face of the Other
Acts	of	suicide	violence	are,	unequivocally,	acts	of	violence	against	 the	face	
or	 being	of	 another.	 The	soldier-martyr	does	 not	 see	 the	 face	of	 the	other.	
rather,	he	sees	the	other	as	a	force	or	barbarity	that	must	be	overcome.59	The	
face,	however,	“opposes	violence	with	metaphysical	resistance”	and	forces	the	
subject	to	accept	responsibility;60	the	existence	of	the	metaphysical	face	of	the	
other	is	the	existence	of	a	covenant	between	human	beings.61	The	soldier-mar-
tyr	strikes	instead	with	the	calculation	that	he	will	no	longer	be	alive	to	bear	
his	own	suffering	or	the	suffering	of	his	victims.	it	is	a	calculation	that	unsuc-
cessfully	attempts	to	physically,	psychologically,	and	metaphysically	erase	the	
face	of	the	other	from	sympathy,	empathy,	consciousness,	and	memory.	of	
course,	the	inevitably	futile	attempt	to	erase	the	face	of	the	other	is	meant	to	
ease	existential	angst	about	killing	and	deny	the	sacred	connectedness	shared	
by	 human	 beings.	 The	 sacred	 connectedness	 of	 human	 beings	 is	 described	
by	esslin	as	the	ability	to	recognize	and	admit	that	we	are	the	other	and	the	
other	is	us.62
Acts	of	suicide	violence	appear	to	treat	otherness	as	fixed	and	incapable	
of	changing;	the	other	is	portrayed	as	an	inherent	or	inescapable	enemy.	it	
is	therefore	not	only	perfectly	acceptable	to	terrorize	and	murder	them,	but	
also	such	acts	close	off	who	the	other	is	and	how	and	if	he	can	transform;	it	
suggests	 that	people	can	slip	 into	otherness	but	hardly	ever	slip	out	of	 it.63	
Using	clichés	such	as	“faceless	enemy,”	moreover,	is	the	feeble	attempt	of	vio-
lent	actors	to	render	nontransformative	the	capacity	of	the	other	to	be	other	
than	expected.	Agathangelou	and	ling	mention	that	the	other	is	often	tar-
geted	as	the	cause	of	violence	and	destruction;	the	self	often	constructs	itself	
as	“innocent,	victimized,	moral,	and	rational,”	and	the	other	as	“demonic,	
murderous,	and	radically	barbaric.”	militarization	is	therefore	regarded	as	a	
moral	imperative.64
For	lévinas,	ethics	is	the	ethics	of	the	other.	An	ethics	with	respect	to	the	
face	of	the	other	is	perhaps	encapsulated	in	the	phrase	“human	qua	other”	
(human	in	the	capacity	of	the	other);	it	is	an	imaginary	substitution:	the	abil-
ity	of	 the	self	 to	substitute	 itself	 for	 the	other	(e.g.,	 to	know	that	we	are	the	
other	and	the	other	is	us).65	here,	it	is	important	to	point	out	that	there	is	a	
difference	between	substitution	and	the	substitute	other,	however	connected	
the	 concepts	 may	 be.	 Substitution	 is	 identification,	 to	 be	 in	 the	 capacity	 of	
the	other;	the	substitute	is	the	person	for	whom	anger	is	wrongly	directed.	
The	ethical	act	not	only	is	the	choice	of	the	actor	to	substitute	himself	for	the	
other,	but	also	ensures	that	anger	is	not	directed	against	substitutes.	Sigmund	
Freud	 spoke	 about	 the	 theme	 of	 wrongly	 directed	 anger	 when	 he	 said	 that	
sometimes	people	seek	to	exact	punishment	for	a	crime	committed	even	if	it	
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does	not	fall	on	the	guilty	party.66	Similarly,	Arendt	argued	that	rage	and	vio-
lence	become	irrational	when	they	are	directed	against	substitutes.67	There	is	
often	a	false	sense	of	certainty	attached	to	suicide	violence	such	that	the	actor	
feels	that	the	targets	of	his	action	are	in	some	way	guilty,	but	when	innocent	
people	 are	 involved,	 his	 anger	 is	 usually	 directed	 at	 substitutes.	 Use	 of	 the	
term	“self-defense”	to	justify	attacks	on	substitute	targets	invariably	becomes	
a	tactic	to	impose	limitless	aggression,	stymie	questions	about	culpability	and	
historical	inquiry,	and	render	retaliation	as	if	it	were	always	moral.
The	banalization	of	suicide	violence	is	further	exposed	through	the	judg-
ments	that	are	used	to	justify	it.	many	strict	and	literalistic	forms	of	religious	
exotericism—and	 many	 soldier-martyrs	 are	 doctrinally	 exoteric—see	 order	
being	 maintained	 when	 people	 are	 coded,	 classified,	 and	 restrained.68	 The	
perceived	crimes	of	a	“lesser	other”	are	coded	and	classified	such	that	it	is	a	
crime	to	be	other	than	the	soldier-martyr’s	group,	to	not	pick	up	arms	against	
the	occupier,	and	to	fail	to	pray	as	often	as	is	required	by	God	(many	widely	
accepted	judgments	about	the	other	tend	to	legitimize	repetitive	acts	of	vio-
lence	against	the	other).	The	disciplining	effects	of	group	surveillance	over	a	
population	are	a	form	of	intimidation	that	determines	with	arbitrary	exclu-
sivity	who	is	a	criminal	body	and	who	is	worthy	of	death	or	punishment.	in	
most	 cases,	 criminality	 is	 what	 the	 other	 does	 that	 does	 not	 accord	 to	 the	
religious,	political,	or	nationalist	expectations	of	the	soldier-martyr’s	group.	
We	envisage	social,	political,	and	religious	forms	of	surveillance,	discipline,	
and	correction	between	social	groups	as	a	kind	of	“panoptic	judgment”	(the	
panoptic	overseeing	of	one	group	upon	another	produces	arbitrary	and	wide-
sweeping	judgment,	and	the	recipients	of	such	judgment	check	their	behavior	
when	they	feel	they	are	being	watched	or	when	they	feel	they	may	be	punished	
or	harmed);	this	is	not	unlike	Foucault’s	notions	of	surveillance	and	discipline	
vis-à-vis	the	Panopticon.	in	order	to	self-annihilate	and	destroy	innocent	life,	
the	soldier-martyr	must	treat	the	targets	of	his	attack	as	if	they	are	all	guilty	
for	some	perceived	crime.	The	purpose	of	panoptic	judgment,	like	the	Panop-
ticon,	is	power:	“to	induce	in	the	[moral,	religious,	or	political	other]	a	state	
of	conscious	and	permanent	visibility	that	assumes	the	automatic	functioning	
of	 power.”69	 in	 the	 panoptic	 view,	 the	 other	 is	 abstracted	 and	 generalized,	
which	renders	 this	body	an	“easy	 target	 for	contempt.	Devoid	of	humanity,	
the	abstract	other	is	outside	of	history,	incapable	of	development,	destined	for	
servitude,	and	degraded	to	a	valueless	object.”70	like	the	imperial	colonizers,	
modern-day	state	oppressors	and	soldier-martyrs	who	target	noncombatants	
strive	 to	embolden	the	perpetrator	mentality	which	 justifies	 the	destructive	
machinery	that	robs	humans	of	their	humanness,	their	soul;	it	renders	them	
“spiritless	matter,	raw	material.”71
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Acts to Habitus: The Banalization of Violence
The	banalization	of	suicide	violence	is	complete	when	the	act	is	rationalized,	
systematized,	routinized,	and	glorified.	These	are	the	other	effects	and	affects	
of	suicide	violence.	The	fog	of	war	is	as	dense	for	the	soldier-martyr	as	it	is	for	
any	state.	Clarity	of	mind	(the	ability	of	the	actor	and	the	masses	to	gaze	upon	
the	effects	of	violence	in	their	midst)	is	substantially	reduced	as	time	passes.	it	
is	not	easy	for	a	collective	to	step	back	from	itself,	from	the	acts	of	its	people,	
and	from	the	conditions	on	the	ground	in	order	to	question	whether	their	own	
complacency	has	allowed	for	the	normalization	of	violence.	The	rationaliza-
tion	 is	always	 there	 that	because	 the	“act”	cut	 right	 into	 the	heart	of	a	 state	
oppressor,	it	was	also	morally	and	religiously	permissible.	Suicide	violence	is	
now	 habitus	 for	 anyone	 seeking	 vengeance	 or	 restitution;	 never	 mind	 God,	
religion,	morality,	ethics,	or	the	sacrality	of	the	human	being.	Suicide	violence	
not	only	has	been	normalized	and	banalized,	but	so	also	have	its	effects	and	
affects.	modern	suicide	violence	becomes	systematic,	calculative,	orderly,	and	
murderous.	in	a	systematic	and	calculative	sense,	soldier-martyrs	calculate	the	
incalculable	benefits	of	martyrdom,	imagining	that	the	deed	will	tip	the	divine	
scales	in	their	favor;	in	this	calculation,	the	martyr	gets	immediate	access	to	
heaven	and	can	put	in	a	word	for	his	next	of	kin	as	well.	The	figure	of	the	sol-
dier-martyr	reproduces	the	militarism	of	the	state	against	which	it	originated.
Current	forms	of	suicide	violence	are	also	routine	and	commonplace.	With	
each	 instance	of	suicide	violence,	 the	act	(and	its	effects	vis-à-vis	detonated	
bomb,	shrapnel,	and	body	bits)	becomes	part	of	the	routine	of	one’s	day.	of	
course,	the	act	is	fueled	by	narratives	of	grandeur	about	the	place	of	the	mar-
tyr	in	heaven,	which	only	serve	to	further	glorify	the	act	despite	its	most	griev-
ous	effects	vis-à-vis	the	carnage	of	human	life.	Actors	who	carry	out	acts	of	
suicide	violence	peer	over	and	attempt	to	control	the	masses	through	threats	
of	punishment.	Disloyalty	is	heavily	punished.	Suicide	violence	has	therefore	
taken	on	its	own	actor;	it	is	now	the	site	of	an	apparatus	of	capture.	The	actor	
and	the	act	are	actually	struggling	 for	control	over	 its	effects	and	affect.	At	
what	point	 in	this	violent	mechanism	does	the	actor	have	to	stop	thinking,	
and	the	machine’s	“artificial”	intelligence	take	over?	At	what	point	does	the	
act	of	suicide	violence	become	the	means,	the	ends,	and	the	only	remaining	
actor	in	the	event	as	it	unfolds?	The	bombers	are	dead	or	are	dying;	the	only	
thing	keeping	this	violent	mechanism	going	is	the	act	itself.	Thus	the	act	is	no	
longer	an	act	but	habitus.
The	 banalization	 and	 normalization	 of	 suicide	 violence	 can	 also	 be	 wit-
nessed	in	the	way	the	act	is	transformed	into	a	gesture,	a	pantomime	of	the	
imagination	that	no	longer	indicates	creation	and	a	will	to	act	(uniquely),	but	
rather	the	endurance	and	continued	support	of	a	status	quo	(locked	in	“the	
sphere	of	a	pure	and	endless”	mediocrity).72	The	notion	of	gesture	or	panto-
mime	suggests	that	the	actor	must	divorce	his	humanity,	on	some	level,	from	
his	act;	the	actor	must	step	outside	of	himself	to	do	the	act.	he	must	stage	the	
action	(the	mime)	by	mimicking	previous	suicide	attacks,	all	the	while	posing	
and	presenting	a	 lionhearted	 image	 to	 the	world.	Though	 few	would	doubt	
that	it	takes	tenacity	and	bravery	to	plunge	knowingly	into	death,	the	actors’	
act	still	contributes	to	the	normalization	of	a	violent	status	quo	and	the	desen-
sitization	of	the	masses	to	violence.	As	spectator,	victim,	and	perpetrator,	it	is	
intolerable	and	ineffable	to	us	that	human	beings	all	over	the	world	are	being	
tortured,	raped,	hacked,	macheted,	and	blown	to	bits,	but	we	are	desensitized	
to	the	ongoing	event	of	violent	being	and	we	tolerate	it;	violence	has	reached	
its	banalized	end,	we	are	rarely	shocked,	and	when	we	are,	the	effects	are	tem-
porary	and,	more	worryingly,	just	as	routinized.73	moreover,	few	can	ignore	
the	way	the	pantomime	unfolds	in	a	social	and	cultural	ritual.	When	we	sug-
gest	that	suicide	violence	is	ritualized,	we	not	only	mean	the	act	itself	(recruit-
ment,	planning,	 training,	recording,	executing,	and	claiming)	but	also	how	
the	act	is	represented	and	imagined	through	cultural	and	social	symbols	that	
normalize	it.	in	some	cases,	the	suicide	bomber	becomes	the	“living	martyr,”	
the	new	Achilles	of	 the	abject.	 in	seeking	a	glorious	death,	 the	martyred	 is	
memorialized	by	his	people.	it	is	a	habitus	among	the	families	of	the	martyred	
soldiers	to	name	future	children	after	their	dead	son	or	daughter.	The	notion	
of	“replacement	children,”	children	regarded	as	replacing	the	soldier-martyr	
in	life	and	mimicking	in	death,	is	a	cultural	and	social	and	domestic	practice	
of	banalized	suicide	violence.
is	it	any	wonder	that	the	“suicide	bomber	doll,”	as	some	commentators	have	
called	it,	would	make	its	appearance	as	a	cultural	symbol?	in	making	and	play-
ing	with	this	doll,	a	violent	habitus	is	cultivated.	it	is	a	toy	for	the	imagination	
emulating	reality,	and	a	toy	for	reality	emulating	the	imagination,	or	 imag-
ined	desires.	however,	the	“suicide	bomber	doll”	is	not	something	conjured	
up	in	the	imaginative	boardrooms	of	America.	Children	do	not	play	with	the	
doll	to	escape	their	own	harsh	and	abject	conditions,	but	rather	to	face	such	
conditions	with	defiance.	in	conditions	of	abjection,	it	reveals	to	young	minds	
how	transforming	can	bring	emancipation	and	how	the	child	can	move	from	
uncertainty	to	certainty	about	the	world.	The	doll	itself	is	a	symbol	of	resis-
tance,	but	what	kind	of	resistance?	To	teach	them	that	an	honorable	death	is	to	
die	to	kill	the	other?	it	is	a	resistance	banalized	from	its	originary	purposes.	
The	 unfortunate	 truth	 of	 the	 doll	 is	 that	 it	 no	 longer	 represents	 a	 glorious	
death,	but	now	a	banalized	one.
Though	his	purpose	was	to	disrupt	a	capitalist	icon	by	fitting	a	bomb	belt	
to	her	waist	and	equipping	her	with	a	detonator	button,	Simon	Tyszko’s	agit-
prop	artwork,	The Suicide Bomber Barbie,	reveals	how	banalized	violence	has	
seeped	into	the	collective	imaginaries.	The	artist	has	identified	a	cultural	icon,	
a	cultural	toy,	one	that	is	mimicked	and	adored	for	her	sharp	fashion	sense,	
and	is	saying	through	his	art,	“See	how	barbie	is	eyeing	and	identifying	new	
‘symbols	of	revolution’”?	in	his	interview	with	a	nine-year-old	Palestinian	girl,	
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his	act;	the	actor	must	step	outside	of	himself	to	do	the	act.	he	must	stage	the	
action	(the	mime)	by	mimicking	previous	suicide	attacks,	all	the	while	posing	
and	presenting	a	 lionhearted	 image	 to	 the	world.	Though	 few	would	doubt	
that	it	takes	tenacity	and	bravery	to	plunge	knowingly	into	death,	the	actors’	
act	still	contributes	to	the	normalization	of	a	violent	status	quo	and	the	desen-
sitization	of	the	masses	to	violence.	As	spectator,	victim,	and	perpetrator,	it	is	
intolerable	and	ineffable	to	us	that	human	beings	all	over	the	world	are	being	
tortured,	raped,	hacked,	macheted,	and	blown	to	bits,	but	we	are	desensitized	
to	the	ongoing	event	of	violent	being	and	we	tolerate	it;	violence	has	reached	
its	banalized	end,	we	are	rarely	shocked,	and	when	we	are,	the	effects	are	tem-
porary	and,	more	worryingly,	just	as	routinized.73	moreover,	few	can	ignore	
the	way	the	pantomime	unfolds	in	a	social	and	cultural	ritual.	When	we	sug-
gest	that	suicide	violence	is	ritualized,	we	not	only	mean	the	act	itself	(recruit-
ment,	planning,	 training,	recording,	executing,	and	claiming)	but	also	how	
the	act	is	represented	and	imagined	through	cultural	and	social	symbols	that	
normalize	it.	in	some	cases,	the	suicide	bomber	becomes	the	“living	martyr,”	
the	new	Achilles	of	 the	abject.	 in	seeking	a	glorious	death,	 the	martyred	 is	
memorialized	by	his	people.	it	is	a	habitus	among	the	families	of	the	martyred	
soldiers	to	name	future	children	after	their	dead	son	or	daughter.	The	notion	
of	“replacement	children,”	children	regarded	as	replacing	the	soldier-martyr	
in	life	and	mimicking	in	death,	is	a	cultural	and	social	and	domestic	practice	
of	banalized	suicide	violence.
is	it	any	wonder	that	the	“suicide	bomber	doll,”	as	some	commentators	have	
called	it,	would	make	its	appearance	as	a	cultural	symbol?	in	making	and	play-
ing	with	this	doll,	a	violent	habitus	is	cultivated.	it	is	a	toy	for	the	imagination	
emulating	reality,	and	a	toy	for	reality	emulating	the	imagination,	or	 imag-
ined	desires.	however,	the	“suicide	bomber	doll”	is	not	something	conjured	
up	in	the	imaginative	boardrooms	of	America.	Children	do	not	play	with	the	
doll	to	escape	their	own	harsh	and	abject	conditions,	but	rather	to	face	such	
conditions	with	defiance.	in	conditions	of	abjection,	it	reveals	to	young	minds	
how	transforming	can	bring	emancipation	and	how	the	child	can	move	from	
uncertainty	to	certainty	about	the	world.	The	doll	itself	is	a	symbol	of	resis-
tance,	but	what	kind	of	resistance?	To	teach	them	that	an	honorable	death	is	to	
die	to	kill	the	other?	it	is	a	resistance	banalized	from	its	originary	purposes.	
The	 unfortunate	 truth	 of	 the	 doll	 is	 that	 it	 no	 longer	 represents	 a	 glorious	
death,	but	now	a	banalized	one.
Though	his	purpose	was	to	disrupt	a	capitalist	icon	by	fitting	a	bomb	belt	
to	her	waist	and	equipping	her	with	a	detonator	button,	Simon	Tyszko’s	agit-
prop	artwork,	The Suicide Bomber Barbie,	reveals	how	banalized	violence	has	
seeped	into	the	collective	imaginaries.	The	artist	has	identified	a	cultural	icon,	
a	cultural	toy,	one	that	is	mimicked	and	adored	for	her	sharp	fashion	sense,	
and	is	saying	through	his	art,	“See	how	barbie	is	eyeing	and	identifying	new	
‘symbols	of	revolution’”?	in	his	interview	with	a	nine-year-old	Palestinian	girl,	
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Tyszko	said	that	the	girl	once	wished	to	be	a	doctor,	but	now	that	she	could	no	
longer	study	or	sleep	at	night,	she	wanted	to	be	a	martyr.	Tyszko,	inspired	by	
this	conversational	exchange,	made	banalized	violence	an	art	in	the	West.	The	
young	girl	had	“effectively	bought	the	notion	of	suicide	bombing	as	a	lifestyle	
choice—it	has	become	aspirational,	an	off	the	shelf	peer	led	option.”	Tyszko’s	
barbie	confronts	the	absurdity	of	the	original	suicide	bomber	doll	by	symbol-
izing	violence	that	became	habitus.74	Tyszko	also	seems	to	have	rekindled	an	
earlier	controversy	about	the	photograph	of	a	baby	bomber	found	in	hebron.	
The	child	is	shown	in	this	photograph	wearing	the	outfit	of	a	hamas	suicide	
bomber,	with	belts	holding	bullets	and	bombs,	and	the	red	bandanna	of	the	
well-recognized	soldier-martyr.75
As	humans,	the	“pang	of	conscience”	is	that	we	may	be	human,	we	may	be	
weak,	and	we	may	actually	sin.76	it	is	through	our	conscience	that	we	become	
aware	that	we	can	sin;	our	conscience	guides	us,	and	it	encourages	us	to	reject	
the	 urge	 to	 punish	 and	 destroy.	 nietzsche	 says	 that	 the	 conscience	 made	
humans	responsible	and	that	this	is	a	late	but	significant	fruit.	in	defense	of	
the	 soldier-martyr,	 he	 actually	 ruptures	 the	 “pang	 of	 conscience”	 on	 many	
levels,	but	not	without	grievous	effects.	There	 is	 a	measure	of	 calm	detach-
ment,	quiet	arrogance,	cool	calculation,	and	total	certainty	attached	to	an	act	
of	suicide	violence.	The	soldier-martyr	calculates,	but	not	in	deference	to	the	
calculations	of	his	conscience;	his	calculation	instead	benefits	individual	and	
group	interests.	The	soldier-martyr	shuts	off	the	conscience	by	means	of	this	
overconfidence,	so	to	speak	(some	would	say	by	way	of	his	religious	certainty):	
of	course,	in	his	mind,	the	soldier-martyr	who	strikes	innocent	life	is	assured	
that	he	is	committing	a	noble	self-sacrifice	and	that	his	sacrifice	is	naturally	
to	 counteract	 the	 injustice	 perpetrated	 against	 those	 he	 identifies	 with;	 he	
walks	the	higher	moral	ground	and	is	not	the	cause	of	a	further	injustice;	and	
he	sees	lofty	illusions	of	martyrdom	as	fulfilling	a	personal	narrative	to	have	
lived	a	noble	life	and	to	have	died	an	idealized	death.77	Confronting	banalized	
violence	is	about	tracking	down	how	a	succession	of	violent	acts	can	destroy	
collective	memory,	conscience,	and	recognition	of	otherness	and	destroy	the	
capacity	for	answerability.
Conclusion
Arendt	often	argued	that	what	makes	men	and	women	political	beings	is	their	
capacity	to	act.78	She	ascribed	particular	importance	to	the	ancient	Greek	con-
ception	of	act,	which	meant	both	governing	and	beginning.79	To	act	means	to	
set	something	in	motion,	to	begin	not	just	something	new	but	also	oneself	as	
that	being	that	acts	to	begin	itself.80	The	fact	 is	that	we	are	beings	endowed	
with	the	capacity	to	act	(or,	as	Sartre	would	say,	“to	be	is	to	act”)	and	that	to	
act	is	to	realize	a	rupture	in	the	given;	to	act	always	means	to	enact	the	unex-
pected	and	unpredictable.81	As	Arendt	would	put	it,	“[T]he	human	heart	is	the	
only	thing	in	the	world	that	will	take	upon	itself	the	burden	that	the	divine	gift	
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Tyszko	said	that	the	girl	once	wished	to	be	a	doctor,	but	now	that	she	could	no	
longer	study	or	sleep	at	night,	she	wanted	to	be	a	martyr.	Tyszko,	inspired	by	
this	conversational	exchange,	made	banalized	violence	an	art	in	the	West.	The	
young	girl	had	“effectively	bought	the	notion	of	suicide	bombing	as	a	lifestyle	
choice—it	has	become	aspirational,	an	off	the	shelf	peer	led	option.”	Tyszko’s	
barbie	confronts	the	absurdity	of	the	original	suicide	bomber	doll	by	symbol-
izing	violence	that	became	habitus.74	Tyszko	also	seems	to	have	rekindled	an	
earlier	controversy	about	the	photograph	of	a	baby	bomber	found	in	hebron.	
The	child	is	shown	in	this	photograph	wearing	the	outfit	of	a	hamas	suicide	
bomber,	with	belts	holding	bullets	and	bombs,	and	the	red	bandanna	of	the	
well-recognized	soldier-martyr.75
As	humans,	the	“pang	of	conscience”	is	that	we	may	be	human,	we	may	be	
weak,	and	we	may	actually	sin.76	it	is	through	our	conscience	that	we	become	
aware	that	we	can	sin;	our	conscience	guides	us,	and	it	encourages	us	to	reject	
the	 urge	 to	 punish	 and	 destroy.	 nietzsche	 says	 that	 the	 conscience	 made	
humans	responsible	and	that	this	is	a	late	but	significant	fruit.	in	defense	of	
the	 soldier-martyr,	 he	 actually	 ruptures	 the	 “pang	 of	 conscience”	 on	 many	
levels,	but	not	without	grievous	effects.	There	 is	 a	measure	of	 calm	detach-
ment,	quiet	arrogance,	cool	calculation,	and	total	certainty	attached	to	an	act	
of	suicide	violence.	The	soldier-martyr	calculates,	but	not	in	deference	to	the	
calculations	of	his	conscience;	his	calculation	instead	benefits	individual	and	
group	interests.	The	soldier-martyr	shuts	off	the	conscience	by	means	of	this	
overconfidence,	so	to	speak	(some	would	say	by	way	of	his	religious	certainty):	
of	course,	in	his	mind,	the	soldier-martyr	who	strikes	innocent	life	is	assured	
that	he	is	committing	a	noble	self-sacrifice	and	that	his	sacrifice	is	naturally	
to	 counteract	 the	 injustice	 perpetrated	 against	 those	 he	 identifies	 with;	 he	
walks	the	higher	moral	ground	and	is	not	the	cause	of	a	further	injustice;	and	
he	sees	lofty	illusions	of	martyrdom	as	fulfilling	a	personal	narrative	to	have	
lived	a	noble	life	and	to	have	died	an	idealized	death.77	Confronting	banalized	
violence	is	about	tracking	down	how	a	succession	of	violent	acts	can	destroy	
collective	memory,	conscience,	and	recognition	of	otherness	and	destroy	the	
capacity	for	answerability.
Conclusion
Arendt	often	argued	that	what	makes	men	and	women	political	beings	is	their	
capacity	to	act.78	She	ascribed	particular	importance	to	the	ancient	Greek	con-
ception	of	act,	which	meant	both	governing	and	beginning.79	To	act	means	to	
set	something	in	motion,	to	begin	not	just	something	new	but	also	oneself	as	
that	being	that	acts	to	begin	itself.80	The	fact	 is	that	we	are	beings	endowed	
with	the	capacity	to	act	(or,	as	Sartre	would	say,	“to	be	is	to	act”)	and	that	to	
act	is	to	realize	a	rupture	in	the	given;	to	act	always	means	to	enact	the	unex-
pected	and	unpredictable.81	As	Arendt	would	put	it,	“[T]he	human	heart	is	the	
only	thing	in	the	world	that	will	take	upon	itself	the	burden	that	the	divine	gift	
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of	action,	of	being	a	beginning	and	therefore	being	able	to	make	a	beginning,	
has	placed	upon	us.”82	We	have	elaborated	an	argument	that	suicide	violence	
against	domination,	oppression,	injustice,	and	abjection,	however	justifiable	
as	original	and	radical,	loses	its	character	as	an	act	when	it	becomes	routine,	
or	as	Arendt	would	say	about	violence	in	general,	it	becomes	most	irrational	
when	it	becomes	rationalized.83	Two	very	important	aspects	of	the	banaliza-
tion	of	suicide	violence	are	the	means-turned-ends	shift,	in	which	the	goal	of	
liberation	is	subordinated	by	the	goal	of	bloodshed,	and	the	everyday	quality	
of	the	act,	in	which	the	daily	practice	of	detonating	bombs	has	become	pro-
saic	and	mimetic.	Thus,	we	concluded,	suicide	violence	is	no	longer	an	act,	a	
beginning,	but	habitus.	We	briefly	addressed	how	indifference,	panoptic	judg-
ments,	and	totalizing	devaluations	of	the	other	have	banalized	and	normal-
ized	suicide	violence,	and	how	such	effects	and	affects	are	also	realized	in	their	
systematization,	routinization,	rationalization,	and	glorification.
it	 is	an	ethical	 impossibility	 for	actors	 to	evade	 the	responsibility	 that	 is	
afforded	to	them	as	acting	and	choosing	beings	by	arguing	that	constraining	
contingencies	and	the	pressure	from	their	groups,	for	example,	gave	them	no	
other	choice	but	 to	 self-annihilate	and	 take	a	 few	dozen	people	with	 them.	
This	is	an	ethical	impossibility	despite	the	inherent	complicity	of	the	founding	
violence	of	states	in	creating	the	conditions	for	suicide	violence	to	flourish	in	
the	first	place.	An	aporia	of	freedom	vis-à-vis	suicide	violence	is	that	it	is	not	
created	 in	a	vacuum	(e.g.,	 the	acts	of	others	often	create	 the	conditions	 for	
violence),	and	yet,	in	the	end,	it	is	the	actor	who	is	still	radically	responsible	
for	choices	he	makes.
We	 ought	 not	 to	 consider	 soldier-martyrs	 as	 “dupes	 or	 mechanisms	 of	
an	 impersonal	 social	 force,	 but	 actors	 with	 responsibility.”84	 yet,	 when	 acts	
of	 suicide	 violence	 are	 transformed	 into	 habitus	 and	 become	 embodied	 in	
the	body	politic,	it	will	be	almost	impossible	to	restore	its	qualities	as	an	act.	
This	mimetic	logic	that	becomes	embedded	as	habitus	continually	produces	
a	compulsion	for	repetition.	robson	spoke	of	“[t]his	compulsion	to	repeat,	to	
repeat	acts	of	suicide,	to	replicate	a	suicidal	state	such	that	it	becomes	a	global	
suicidal	state.”85	The	repercussions	of	this	create	a	neurosis	of	the	body	politic	
and	of	 the	citizen	through	which	the	fear	of	repetition	creates	more	repeti-
tion.86	The	“War	on	Terror”	and	suicide	violence	become	two	aspects	of	the	
same	cycle	of	repetition	that	produces	the	neurotic	citizen.87
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